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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Corn was said to be invented almost 7000 years ago in Mexico (Brush, Bello Corrales, 
Ella 1988:309). It started from a wild grass called teosinte.  Corn or maize (zea mays) as it 
was called was considered a sacred plant, and great civilizations of Mesoamerica, the Maya, 
Aztec, Toltec, Zapotec, Mixtec, Olmec, and others, could not have existed without it. It 
formed the basis of their diet and was their most revered crop.  Corn not only played a 
nutritional role but it also held a sacred position in native society.   
The indigenous people lived by and for corn; it was integral to all aspects of life from 
religion to mythology. The Maya considered corn a gift from the gods and believed that 
cultivating it was a sacred duty. In the Mayan Book of Origins, The Popol Vuh, there is a 
sequence of four efforts that were performed at creation: First animals were created, but they 
could only speak in animal tongue and therefore did not have the humanness to speak their 
creators’ name. Then wet clay was tried, but this just crumbled and dissolved away. Next 
wood was used to fashion dolls, but they had no blood or sweat and were deemed useless. So 
last, the creation of the first ancestors was fashioned from maize dough that was produced by 
the gods mixing their own blood with corn flour to create humankind. And from then on the 
Maya were referred to as children of the corn who worshipped the tall grass that fed them and 
enabled their culture to flourish. Corn was not only nutrition but played a divine role in the 
lives of the natives, and today corn remains the staple crop in Mexico and still holds its divine 
place in Mexican society. 
Moreover, today corn remains a fundamental element of Mexican culture.  Corn 
shapes the daily meals in Mexico and is used in staple foods like the tortilla, taco, tamale and 
pozole (made from hominy, a traditional soup or stew from Mexico, which once had ritual 
significance) to name a few.   Corn is still associated with sacred meaning in Mexico and is 
the center of many festivals and religious ceremonies where the plant is worshipped.  Many 
indigenous groups in Mexico continue to use corn to create things as elaborate as shelter or as 
simple as crafts that can be sold to the tourist.  Corn is the lifeblood of Mexican culture and 
society and today as well as centuries ago it continues to feed the body and soul of its people. 
I have been fortunate enough to experience firsthand the importance and significance 
of corn in Mexican culture, when I lived there for a period of time, in a little town outside 
Mérida Mexico.  I lived with a local family, in a modest house outside the center of town. 
Every morning as the rooster crowed, we would wake to the smell of the corn tortillas being 
cooked on the traditional comal (a flat griddle placed over the fire to cook tortillas).  Tortillas 
were served at every meal and I quickly learned of their versatility. I remember when I had 
my first meal with my host family, I watched closely and was amazed at the ingenious way 
they used the tortilla not only as food but also as a utensil, scooping up food as one would use 
a fork or folding the tortilla into a neat pocket that allowed the recipient to enjoy every morsel 
that was on their plate.  Corn was served everywhere, in every house and establishment, it was 
the main staple of the Mexican diet, but the consumption was only part of the story. 
I remember many days that I would accompany my host family on trips to the Molina 
(corn mill), to get the ground corn paste to make the tortillas.  As you approached the Molina 
you could hear the sounds and smells of the raw corn being processed.  The machine doing 
the work was enormous, with a myriad of moving archaic parts all working in unison, 
chugging along to wring out the corn meal into the waiting containers of the local clientele.  
As you entered the Molina you were always greeted by the owners and their family who were 
all taking part in the production.  There were customers, onlookers and passersby all 
exchanging pleasantries, news and the town’s gossip.  This was more than just a place to get 
corn ground; this was the town water cooler.  Corn was everywhere, and it linked everything 
and everyone together. This ancient, manipulated plant was much more than just an ingredient 
to make tortillas, it was the heart of the people who called Mexico their home. Corn has 
always been the economic and cultural life blood of Mexico.  For years corn farmers and their 
families have been working the soil to grow corn, but the economic, social and cultural 
landscape is/has rapidly changed with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).   
THESIS: 
Many people have opposed the passage of NAFTA and large uprisings like the 
Zapatista movement have highlighted opposition to this agreement. While the U.S. and 
Mexican governments backed the NAFTA agreement as a way to create jobs in Mexico and 
reduce illegal immigration to the United States, the opposition regarded NAFTA as an 
instrument that would put into place economic policies that would marginalize Mexico’s 
lower class especially hurting rural indigenous communities.  
NAFTA did prove to devastate rural livelihoods, increase unemployment, and cause a 
mass exodus of illegal migration to the United States. The number of Mexicans migrating to 
the United States increased steadily from approximately 350.000 per year before NAFTA to 
500,000 per year by the early 2000s. (Gonzales 2011: 725). The U.S. continues to focus on 
border security and enforcement without taking into account the economic devastation that is 
a clear consequence of the NAFTA agreement.  Mexicans fled their homeland after many 
experienced the effects NAFTA taking away their livelihoods, leaving them little choice but 
to look north for more opportunity as a cure to their economic plight.  
The United States views Mexican immigration as a national security and economic 
problem.  The U.S. is in a constant state of looking to increase border enforcement instead of 
looking at core reasons for why Mexicans have been migrating to the U.S. higher rates.  
NAFTA has caused a great deal of pressure on small farmers in Mexico and, as I examine the 
treaty, I will show that because of the impact of trade liberalization,  Mexico’s indigenous and 
poorer classes have been put at a disadvantage and are struggling to compete in the realm of 
NAFTA. 
 The thesis argues that NAFTA transformed the production and distribution of corn in 
Mexico in ways that impacted negatively on the lives of small farmers through economic and, 
eventually, spatial displacement.  I first look at the history of corn and Mexico to show how 
the past put Mexico at a disadvantage from the beginning of the NAFTA regime.  Second, I 
describe the work and effects of NAFTA-era social movements that pursued economic justice 
for indigenous and lower classes and brought their issues to the public.  Third, I examine the 
NAFTA deal that set the indigenous of Mexico at a great disadvantage through unfair 
subsidies and corn dumping.  Fourth, I critically evaluate the theory of comparative advantage 
in the context of the NAFTA treaty.  Fifth, I look at the Zapatista movement and NAFTA as a 
dialectical phenomenon, best understood as having been mutually shaped through the treaty’s 
neoliberal regime of “free trade” and the social movement formation that arises as 
contestation and alternative to such a regime. Lastly, I consider solutions for NAFTA and 
future agreements and look at how economic justice concepts can help avoid repeating the 
mistakes of NAFTA.  
 
THE HISTORY OF CORN 
The English word “corn” is itself somewhat of a misnomer since the plant is properly 
called maize.  The word “corn,” which originally meant grain, came to stand for the one 
arguably most important grain throughout the world. Botanically, maize or corn is a grass, of 
the family Gramineae, which includes such common plants as wheat, oats, barley, rye and 
rice, the sorghums, sugarcane, and the bamboos. These and many other species of lesser 
importance are classified in some twenty tribes, of which Maydeae is one (Walden 1966:2).  
When we think of corn we think of the yellow kernel on a cob, but the fact is that corn comes 
in many different forms and varieties with various applications. 
The Maydeae includes corn in all its varieties: dent corn, flint corn, flour corn, 
popcorn and several others in the genus Zea, and two closely related genera, the wild grasses 
Euchlanena (commonly called teosinte) and Tripsacum (Walden 1966:2).  The scientific name 
Zea Mays is the name given to maize by the Swedish scientist Karl von Linne, who 
established, around 1750 the system of binomial nomenclature.  Zea is derived from the 
Greek word meaning grain or cereal; mays (which eventually evolved into maize) stems from 
the aboriginal American sound maize, approximating an inference of the universal mother, or 
that which sustains life. Over a period of a thousand of years corn was discovered, 
transformed and passed on to the rest of the world. 
Native Americans were crucial in purposefully transforming maize through special 
cultivation techniques. Maize was developed from a wild grass called teosinte, originally 
growing in Central America (southern Mexico) 7,000 years ago. The ancestral kernels of 
teosinte looked very different from today's corn. These kernels were small and were not fused 
together like the kernels on the husked ear of early maize and modern corn.  The Native 
Americans scientifically worked with the plant teosinte and were able to produce a viable new 
food source.  
By systematically collecting and cultivating those plants best suited for human 
consumption, Native Americans encouraged the formation of ears or cobs on early maize. The 
first ears of maize were only a few inches long and had only eight rows of kernels. Cob length 
and size of early maize grew over the next several thousand years which gradually increased 
the yields of each crop  (Fussell 2004:16). 
Eventually the productivity of maize cultivation was great enough to make it possible 
and worthwhile for a family to produce food for the bulk of their diet for an entire year from a 
small area. Although maize agriculture permitted a family to live in one place for an extended 
period of time, the commitment to agriculture involved demands on human time and labor and 
often restricted mobility. The genetic alterations in teosinte changed its value as a food 
resource and at the same time affected the human scheduling necessary for its effective 
procurement. When Europe began to explore the new world corn would become a discovery 
that forever changed the food industry around the world (Fussell 2004:19).  
For western civilization corn began with Columbus in 1942 when two of Christopher 
Columbus’s men reported back to their captain from a journey to explore the interior of Cuba. 
Columbus recorded in his journal that the men had found the land planted with “a sort of grain 
they call Maize, which is very well tasted when boiled, roasted, or made into porridge” 
(Fussell 2004:17).  When Christopher Columbus encountered corn for the first time he was 
probably not aware that he had come across a commodity that would prove to be more 
valuable than the gold and spices he had originally set out to find. 
The story of corn and the early Americas is well-known. We know that the corn John 
Smith and Jamestown colonists stole from Indian caches helped them to stave off hunger; we 
know that the Whiskey Rebels cared about liquor less for drinking than as a way to get their 
fragile corn crop to distant markets. We know that the Ohio Valley, with its corn and hogs and 
whiskey, was a buffer between the North and South in the antebellum years, and how 
westward migration undercut the Ohio Valley Region’s political power until it could no 
longer stave off war  (Richardson 2010: 2). Corn has a long history whose story is lost to the 
many that enjoy it on a daily basis 
Few of us pay much attention to the later history of corn, although there is no food in 
America that has a bigger effect on our lives. It is the country’s biggest crop. The USDA 
reports that in 2009, the nation produced a record corn crop of 13.2 billion bushels. Only 
China comes close to the U.S. production of corn, but its production has not kept up with its 
growing population, and it has been importing corn from the U.S. (at least until recently, 
when it rejected a U.S. cargo ship full of corn because the ship contained a strain of 
genetically modified corn outside of trade agreements) (Richardson: 2010). Corn has fallen 
under several forms of protectionism over the years and it continues to be regulated today. 
The rise of corn started in the late-nineteenth century, when impoverished western 
farmers agitated for a system in which they could store crops rather than sell them in a weak 
market. This idea grew until the Great Depression, when, under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
the government began to regulate production, paying farmers to keep land uncultivated and 
offering loans to sustain farmers during bad market periods. The restriction of corn production 
managed to keep prices high enough to keep farmers from starving, but it did make food 
prices susceptible to sudden rises, a volatility that could be a terrible political liability for any 
president. 
Federal regulation of production managed the corn crop until 1972, when the sale of 
30 million tons of corn to Russia combined with a bad harvest made domestic corn prices 
spike. This meant that animal feed prices rose, too, and higher prices found their way to the 
supermarket. By 1973, food prices were so high that meat became a luxury and middle-class 
mothers worried about feeding their children. President Nixon well understood the political 
power of a restive middle class, and he launched a new program to make sure that food prices 
fell quickly (Richardson: 2010).  
Nixon’s second Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, dramatically changed government 
support for corn. No longer would the government support prices by managing the crop. After 
the carefully-named Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (aka the Farm Act of 
1973), the government urged as much production as possible and guaranteed farmers a target 
price for their corn. Rather than limiting production, the government made direct payments to 
farmers for every bushel of corn they produced. Under the new system, production climbed 
into billions of bushels. 
Production got another boost after 2005 when the Energy Policy Act passed into law 
and required increasing amounts of ethanol, made from corn, to be mixed with gasoline. Two 
years later, President George W. Bush launched an initiative to turn even more dramatically to 
ethanol to reduce the nation’s dependence on oil by 20% by 2017. The scientific journal 
Nature immediately warned that this initiative would actually move the development of 
biofuels backward since corn is inefficient as fuel, but corn farmers loved the proposal. Corn 
production leaped even higher. Today more than a quarter of that production goes to produce 
ethanol (Richardson: 2010). The flood of cheap corn on the market caused a number of 
dramatic effects and has involved the government deeply in agricultural corn production.  
 Corn farmers were faced with little choice as the price of corn dropped; the only way 
to survive was plant more and more so they could collect sufficient subsidy revenue. Farm 
subsidies now run over $12 billion a year. Government statistics don’t easily reveal how much 
of that money goes to corn growers, but, according to the USDA, 97% of the farms that grow 
grain collect subsidies, and 90% of grain growers produce corn. It has cemented the power of 
agribusiness as more than 60% of subsidy money goes to big growers. The push for 
production favors agribusiness, which can exercise huge economies of scale. Nixon and Butz 
not only foresaw this move but encouraged it because they believed it would keep prices 
down and keep them favorable in the public’s eye  (Richardson: 2010). Having this 
tremendous surplus of corn has had food scientists scrambling for ways to develop new uses 
for it.  
Cheap corn has also changed the way we eat. It finds its way into most of the foods in 
American supermarkets, as high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) into soda and processed foods, of 
course, but also into less obvious places like beef, since corn was so cheap cattle growers began 
to use it to feed animals that had always fattened on grass. Organizations that are concerned 
about America’s obesity epidemic have pointed to the ubiquity of cheap corn as a key 
ingredient in our increasing health problems. 
It has also most likely changed recent demographics. Researchers speculate that 
heavily subsidized US corn, when combined with NAFTA, disrupted employment in and 
livelihood possibilities in rural Mexico, where small farmers can’t compete with cheap US 
corn and as a result small Mexican farmers have left rural regions to move to large cities in 
Mexico.  As displaced farmers look for opportunities they begin to migrate north and set their 
sights on US farm operations to find work.  
The Great Plains states that decry big government and demand a smaller federal 
budget depend on agricultural subsidies. According to the Department of Commerce, 
subsidies provide up to 40% of personal income in counties across the Great Plains. In the 
current drive to slash the budget, it’s hard to see how the $12 billion price tag of agricultural 
subsidies cannot be on the table for cuts, but it’s also hard to believe that Plains voters will 
support such cuts. How this will play out is anyone’s guess, but it will certainly be a factor in 
the political debates of the next few years. 
Corn is a vital and politicized crop in both the United States and Mexico and the 
World.  Corn defines many different areas of society and can even take on significance as a 
marker of autonomy by its users. Threats to corn can call into question a people’s or a 
nation’s food sovereignty, the right to maintain and develop a community’s capacity to 
produce culturally appropriate staple foods of its people.  NAFTA has threatened Mexico’s 
sovereignty in corn by forcing trade regulations on the grain that have pushed many small 
Mexican farmers out of business, changing the landscape economically and socially.   
THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN MEXICO 
 The environmental justice movement began to appear in the 1980’s.  The movement 
was aimed at the fair treatment of all peoples regardless of race, color, sex, national origin or 
income in regards to environmental issues.  This movement sought to give all peoples 
protection against environmental hazards and a say in environmental law so that no one group 
had carte blanch over another in environmental issues. This meant that low-income 
communities and communities of color would not be overrun by agribusiness that might 
otherwise choose profit over wellbeing.  The environmental justice movement took on many 
issues and gave the disadvantaged a voice that sought to protect them against the environmental 
injustices facing them.  
There have been and continue to be environmental movements in Mexico.  These are 
grassroots struggles over the natural resources and right to life that have sought to bring out in 
the open and resist injustices that are being imposed upon them.  These movements have varied 
in their purpose but one thing that remains constant is that the groups that are involved are 
identified by high levels of poverty and marginalized social status. These groups fighting for 
environmental justice can also be seen as fighting for the bigger cause of economic and social 
justice.  
Indigenous peoples in environmental justice hold a unique position because of their 
rights as the original inhabitants of their land.  In the United States there are federally 
recognized Indian tribes that hold complete control and authority over the lands they occupy.  
In Mexico the indigenous inhabitants have not achieved the same autonomy that Indians in the 
United States have achieved.  The Zapatista movement in 1994 brought to the forefront the 
plight of the indigenous in Chiapas, Mexico who enjoyed little protection of rights or voice in 
economic, political and legal decisions affecting their communities.  
The struggle for indigenous rights and self-determination in Mexico involves four key 
issues: 1) on-the ground experiences of autonomy both historically and currently; 2) the signing 
of the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture and their implementation; 3) the 
creation and maintenance of a national movement for indigenous autonomy in Mexico out of 
diverse experiences and interpretations of autonomy and self-determination; and 4) a 
redefinition of the relationship between Indian peoples and the Mexican state away from the 
historical focus on indigenism, which had assimilation as its goal (Fox 1991:1).   These issues 
have shaped the identity of the indigenous, and today there is still an ongoing struggle for their 
rights and autonomy.  
The indigenous in Mexico have been labeled uncivilized by early colonizers, who 
taught these putatively inferior humans the ways of the civilized man.  During the seventeenth 
century, Spanish colonizers held legal title to over half of Mexico’s arable and grazing land 
(Gonzales 2011: 732). The indigenous in Mexico have been fighting for land rights from early 
history up until the present day.  The Mexican Government has done little to help the 
indigenous to gain equal access to land and government participation. 
After the Mexican independence the government’s idea was to incorporate indigenous 
communities into local governments. Persons in power pushed indigenous to assimilate with 
the hope that they would mix and procreate with others and the end result would erase a 
definable lineage. The government saw ingenious held land as an impediment to progress and 
sought to privatize these land holdings.  The government proceeded to privatize land and by 
1911 ninety-five percent of Mexico’s rural population was excluded from ownership of land 
(Gonzales 2011: 732).  When you are stripped of your land and identity, it becomes difficult to 
function in a new society that is not favorable to your identity. It was just a matter of time 
before all these actions against the natives boiled over and prompted the rural population to 
retreat back to its origin and lay the ground work for revolution.   
The Mexican Revolution took back land from the wealthy and redistributed it to the 
poor through the ejido system. Ejido land was communally owned land that the state would 
parcel out to landless peasants. Ejido land could not be sold, rented or mortgaged. It could, 
however, be inherited (Gonzales 2011:734). The Mexican Revolution was successful in land 
redistribution, but it did not really succeed in giving back indigenous autonomy.  The next 
revolution to take place in Mexico was not a military revolution but a Green Revolution.  
During the 1950’s the Green Revolution was enacted, which was an agricultural policy 
that focused on modernizing the agricultural sector.  The Green Revolutions goal was to reduce 
hunger by increasing food production through genetically modified seeds that was financed by 
the Rockefeller and Ford foundation (Gonzales 2011:734).  The Green Revolution was 
successful in producing an abundance of food, but it primarily benefited wealthier farmers who 
could afford the seeds, agrochemicals and irrigation equipment required to yield bigger crops. 
At this time global agriculture output was increasing, which led to commodity prices falling 
and hurt the livelihoods of smaller farmers. The Green Revolution can be credited as one of the 
first agricultural policy disasters that pushed poor farmers into the cities, with many of them 
migrating to the United States.  Once migration started it became impossible to stop and even 
the Mexican government’s massive investment in agriculture in the 1970’s and 80’s could not 
stop the exodus of poorer peoples to the U.S.  
In the 1980’s Mexico was hit with the debt crisis, which ushered in free market reforms 
that put an end to government subsidies to indigenous communities. The Mexican 
government’s strategies were to focus on exports that favored large agricultural exporters, 
again leaving the small farmer behind. In another attempt to modernize the agricultural sector 
the government began to permit the privatization of ejidos that put an end to any redistribution 
of land back to the natives (Gonzales 2011:739).   These agricultural modernizations would 
prove to be the catalysts that would push the indigenous communities to the breaking point.  
There has been a history of autonomy in Mexico and there are many groups that 
identify themselves as culturally independent.  Many of these groups have organized their 
communities and retained or regained native territory.  These autonomous groups have created 
groups and coalitions that have come together in the cause of protecting their indigenous rights   
in and outside the boundaries of the state. The San Andrés Accords was an agreement that 
would give back status, insuring social justice and indigenous rights. 
The San Andrés Accords are agreements reached between the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation and the Mexican government. The accords were signed on February 16, 
1996, in San Andrés Larráinzar, Chiapas, and granted autonomy, recognition, and rights to the 
indigenous population of Mexico. The accords were based on five principles of basic respect 
for the diversity of the indigenous population of Chiapas, the conservation of the natural 
resources within the territories used and occupied by indigenous peoples, greater participation 
of indigenous communities in the decisions and control of public expenditures, the participation 
of indigenous communities in determining their own development plans, and the autonomy of 
indigenous communities and their right of free determination in the framework of the state. The 
accords were discussed and approved by representatives of all the indigenous communities of 
Mexico, and translated into the different indigenous languages throughout Mexico (Fox 
1991:12)  
The San Andrés Accords were important to the indigenous in Mexico.  The Accords 
would give them recognition that was lacking for many years and grant a certain level of 
protection both politically and culturally. The Accords provide that the state will take 
responsibility for not only reinforcing the political representation of indigenous peoples and 
their participation in legislatures, but also for guaranteeing the validity of internal forms of 
indigenous government. They further note that the state promises to create national legislation 
guaranteeing indigenous communities the right to: 1) freely associate themselves with 
municipalities that are primarily indigenous in population; 2) to form associations between 
communities; and 3) to coordinate their actions as indigenous peoples (Fox 1991:3). The San 
Andrés Accords gave the indigenous the right to autonomy and self-determination.  The big 
problem with the Accords was that they did not deal with any land redistribution or agrarian 
reform.   
The San Andrés Accords did not address land reform and only agreed to address the 
issue in the future.  The primary occupation of the indigenous in Mexico is farming.  Not taking 
action toward land reform proved detrimental to the indigenous farmers’ future.  Mexico has 
yet to implement substantive land reform and instead has held a position that the land in 
Mexico is not any one group’s by right and that no group shall hold any special privileges over 
the land.  Not addressing land reform has allowed for big agribusiness to establish itself 
throughout the country taking over big pieces of land and pushing the natives out of work and 
out of business. 
 Environmental advocates have been calling for fairness in trade. However, the 
complexity of these agreements has made it difficult for certain communities to understand and 
participate in these negotiations.  In the next section I will examine the comparative advantage 
theory in trade and how the theory was used to shape the NAFTA agreement at a great 
disadvantage to Mexico.  
THE NAFTA NEGOTIATIONS 
The impetus for NAFTA actually began with President Ronald Reagan, who 
campaigned on a North American common market. In 1984, the US Congress passed the 
Trade and Tariff Act (Orme 1996: 3). This is important because it gave the President "fast-
track" authority to negotiate free trade agreements, while only allowing Congress the ability 
to approve or disapprove, not change negotiating points. Canadian Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney agreed with Reagan to begin negotiations for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, which was signed in 1988, went into effect in 1989 and is now suspended due to 
NAFTA.  
Meanwhile, Mexican President Carlos Salinas and U.S. President Herbert Walker 
Bush began negotiations for liberalized trade between the two countries. Prior to NAFTA, 
Mexican tariffs on U.S. imports were 250% higher than U.S. tariffs on Mexican imports 
(Orme 1996:18).  In 1991, Canada requested a trilateral agreement, which then led to 
NAFTA.  It is important to look at the negotiations of NAFTA to see how this agreement was 
crafted. 
The United States came into the negotiations already holding the upper hand.  The US 
held almost ninety percent of the aggregate gross domestic product of the three countries at 
the time of the negotiations  (Orme 1996:16) Gaining access to the U.S. market meant that the 
other parties would have to give up something.  The US had leverage in the negotiations and 
used it to its advantage.  For Mexico it was already a difficult time.  
During this time Mexico was in the grips of a recession and oil prices have brought 
them to the brink of default on their foreign debt. To further compound the situation Eastern 
Europe liberalized its markets after the Cold War. This liberalization was an opportunity for 
foreign investment to tap into a new market that had been previously closed off.  For Mexico 
it meant competition for investment dollars.  With all these variables playing out it became a 
perfect time for Mexico to enter into a free trade agreement. 
During negotiations distinct groups were formed to deal with different areas of trade. 
With regards to Mexico and agriculture the U.S. had three objectives: 1) protect U.S. 
producers, 2) open up Mexican markets, and 3) weaken the FTA provisions on subsidies 
present in the existing Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (Pital 1992:2).  The U.S. 
wanted to protect itself and its farmers against Mexico flooding its market with cheap grains 
while also having complete access to the Mexican markets.  The Mexicans for their part felt 
that they were being impeded by U.S. tariffs and quotas and wanted a fairer reciprocity 
between the two countries.  From the beginning Mexico was sensitive about completely 
opening up its markets, but the U.S. demanded that they liberalize their markets across the 
board.  Unless Mexico opened their markets and placed corn on the table, the Mexicans would 
have no access to lucrative U.S. markets such as orange juice and sugar.  Mexico agreed to 
liberalization across the board if the U.S. did the same. Because of the negotiation position 
and power of the U.S. Mexico agreed to liberalize its market and include corn in the deal  
(Pital 1992:4). The U.S. being the strongest country in the treaty flexed their muscle at every 
opportunity.  
The U.S. used its power to also gain an advantage in the investment and financial 
services.  Mexico came in to the negotiations with a protectionist stance, but the U.S. using its 
power wore Mexico down.  In the end Mexico would give the U.S. broader investment 
opportunities and open up banking with U.S. branches in Mexico.  The U.S. held the position 
that if these other areas were not on the table then the deal would be off.  In the beginning no 
financial services were to be part of the agreement, but by the end the U.S. got what they 
wanted and the Mexican markets were uncapped.  
THE NAFTA AGREEMENT: 
NAFTA, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, is a trade agreement between the 
United States, Canada and Mexico whose purpose is to gradually break down trade 
restrictions and barriers between these three countries over a period of 10 to 15 years.  Mexico 
had begun movement toward free market reform in the eighties; the Salinas administration 
saw this as an opportunity to turn their tattered economy around.  The U.S. enthusiastically 
welcomed Mexico into this agreement but failed to deliver the benefits that Mexico hoped a 
level playing field would offer – perhaps because it was not truly a level playing field.  
The explicit Objectives of the Agreement were: a) to eliminate trade barriers and let 
goods and services pass between borders with little or no restrictions; b) to promote and create 
fair competition between members; c) to create investment opportunities to all parties; d) to 
provide protection of intellectual property rights; e) to create effective procedures for the 
implementation and application of the Agreement and form a governing body for the 
resolution of disputes; and f) to establish a framework to enhance the agreement and promote 
cooperation among all three parties to the agreement. 
Under NAFTA, all non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade between the United States 
and Mexico were eliminated. In addition, many tariffs were eliminated immediately, with 
others being phased out over periods of 5 to 15 years. This allowed for an orderly adjustment 
to free trade with Mexico, with full implementation beginning January 1, 2008.   
In the beginning NAFTA looked good for Mexico as it would open up markets and 
spur foreign investment that would fuel the Mexican economy and create more jobs and a 
stronger economy.  In the initial phases of NAFTA investment and trade were bolstered.  
Exports from Mexico after NAFTA dramatically increased.  So in the beginning things looked 
good and prosperous for Mexico.  The problem was that the heyday of NAFTA would be 
short lived and skewed against Mexico.  For corn in Mexico NAFTA was disastrous and 
started a displacement of the market. 
Mexico allowed for corn to be bundled into the NAFTA agreement.  This was a 
crucial decision given that corn is the country’s staple crop which, in addition to its central 
place in the Mexican economy, has wide-ranging ideological, social and cultural meanings for 
the Mexican people.  The first and most obvious problem with allowing Mexican corn on the 
open market was that it now had to compete with U.S. corn, which was considerably cheaper.  
Small Mexican farmers had always had to contend with a large domestic agribusiness but 
allowing the U.S. into the fray tipped the scales impossibly against them. The obvious 
question is why would Mexico allow for the US to export its corn into the Mexican Market? 
The Mexican farmer was by no means in favor of NAFTA.  Farmers knew that they 
could not compete with cheaper and more efficiently-produced corn.  Those who supported 
NAFTA were not completely oblivious to the possible negative effects that trade 
liberalization might have on the Mexican corn markets, but rather than putting in some real, 
upfront examination on the problem they chose instead to offer a blanket crop substitution 
solution that was ill conceived and something that proved easier said than done.   
One directive of NAFTA was that Mexican farmers would grow alternative crops that 
would be something desired by U.S. and Canadian consumers, which in turn would lead to a 
higher demand.  Mexico produces a wide variety of fruits and vegetables that were for the 
most part unknown in the Northern countries; there was potential to market and sell these 
“exotic” fruits north of the border, which in turn would create a new demand.  Mango and 
avocados are two examples of fruits that have caught on in the U.S. and have created a market 
that previously was very limited. According to Mexico one of many roadblocks that 
undermined the successful realization of this initiative was that farmers were never given the 
training, support, or funds required to convert corn fields into other profitable crops 
(Villarreal 2010:11). Training a farmer in new crop cultivation is a primary concern.  But, 
even when that is possible, changing a crop is a process which generally takes several years, 
and few farmers have the financial resources to support themselves for such a length of time, 
making the transition financially impossible for them.  The third concern is whether there will 
actually prove to be a market for new crops. No one can guarantee the farmer’s success on the 
open market, and no one can predict the fickle taste of the consumer. 
NAFTA has been very good to large agribusinesses and has delivered the fortune it 
promised to many of them.  Since NAFTA has taken away many of the measures which were 
originally put in place to protect the smaller farmers and regulate the system the power and 
leverage has tipped the scales to favor bigger companies that produce raw agricultural 
products, whose relative power and leverage has grown and exerted pressure on both farmers 
and consumers. Instead of safeguarding the smaller grower, the government, both in Mexico 
and the U.S., has made it easy for large agribusiness to control the markets (Villarreal 
2010:15). How did corn flow so cheaply over the border when NAFTA originally said it 
would help protect the Mexican small farmer? 
In 1992 the Salinas government amended the constitution and overturned its ejido 
laws.  The ejido laws allowed landless farmers to petition the government for a small parcel of 
land that they could farm on. The farmer did not own the land outright, but was allowed to use 
the land indefinitely as long as it was not left unused for more than a couple of years.  Salinas 
overturned these ejido laws, claiming that resulting low productivity was a barrier to the 
country’s progress. In reality the laws were overturned because the ejido system, which pre-
dated the Spanish Conquest of Mexico, and symbolized the agrarian reform ushered in with 
the Mexican Revolution, contradicted NAFTA’s ideology of privatization.  After NAFTA 
took effect, ejido lands were taken away from small farmers and turned over to the control of 
big companies. With the repeal of ejido laws small farmers saw their land confiscated and 
their livelihoods lost, and many where driven out of their communities, forcing them to look 
for a new source of income to make a living.  The repeal of the ejido put many small farmers 
out of work and the ones who were left would soon have to contend with a much bigger 
monster that would threaten their livelihoods, coming in the form of cheap U.S. corn, fueled 
by subsidies (Pital 1992:10).  
NAFTA provided for a 15-year timetable that would gradually phase out Mexican 
tariffs on corn, but the Mexican government decided to lift all tariffs almost immediately, and 
dismantled key programs, such as crop price supports to staple producers, subsidies for 
agricultural inputs, credit and insurance, state owned retailing, and targeted state consumption 
subsidies.  Removing these safeguards sent a shock wave through the small Mexican farming 
industry, and with nothing to protect them small farmers were at risk of losing everything they 
had worked for.  In the end, according to The Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy, the 
Mexican government cut its overall investment in agriculture by 90 percent in the first seven 
years of NAFTA as well as its farm support payments by more than half.  The Mexican 
farmer now had to compete unfairly in the free market with no safety net while the U.S. was 
exporting its highly subsidized corn into Mexico.  It is noteworthy that the United States 
continued to subsidize its corn industry after the implementation of NAFTA, while 
comparable or reciprocal practices in Mexico, whether in the form of tariffs or subsidies, were 
discontinued (Pital 1992:22).  
IMPACT OF NAFTA ON MEXICAN CORN 
 While many of the arguments for NAFTA rested on assumptions around idealized free 
markets and their benefits, the reality on the ground has been rather different. Since Mexico 
began importing corn from the United States, Mexican producers have found themselves 
competing directly with U.S. producers who are selling at prices significantly lower than those 
in Mexico. Low U.S. corn prices set the international price because the U.S. is the largest 
producer and exporter of corn.  
Corn was of great importance In Mexico’s agricultural sector and was initially to be 
treated very carefully.  Many farmers and families depended on corn and NAFTA was a 
looming reality that could threaten the livelihood of many people.  In the beginning NAFTA 
was to establish a long transition period for the corn sector, allowing fifteen years for corn to 
align domestic corn prices with international prices.  At the start of the transition period a tariff-
rate quota (TRQ) system was applied that would phase out over time. A TRQ combines two 
policy instruments that nations historically have used to restrict such imports: quotas and 
tariffs. In a TRQ, the quota component works together with a specified tariff level to provide 
the desired degree of import protection.  During the fifteen year transition period, the tariff-free 
quota (initially set at 2.5 million tons per year) was to expand at a constant rate of 3% per 
annum, while the applicable ad valorem tariff for imports exceeding the quota would be 
reduced from 206% in 1994 to zero by 2008 (Nadal 2000:5).  This phase-out system would 
give Mexico time to adjust and adapt to the staggering amount of low priced corn that would 
soon enter its markets. 
 Mexican farmers were assured that during the transition period they would receive 
support through various mechanisms, such as infrastructure investment and new agricultural 
research and development.  In theory by the time the TRQ was dissolved the Mexican farmers 
would be trained and ready to compete in other agricultural products.  Giving the Mexican, 
small farmer time to adapt to the treaty seemed a better option than eliminating all safeguards at 
once, but this is what happened (Siacon 2003).    Mexico decided early on that it would 
waive the TRQ due to domestic production shortfalls and inflationary pressure.  In Mexico, the 
flood of imports produced a significant drop in producer prices. Real prices fell by 25% in the 
years following NAFTA. By 2002 they were 47% below their pre-NAFTA levels (Siacon 
2003).  Cheaper prices for corn did not initially cause harm to the Mexican corn farmers, 
because during this time corn consumption rose from 8.9% of total corn consumption in the 
pre-NAFTA period to 21.3% according to Nadal.  What was the reason for this?  There are 
several: first because the Mexican government did not subsidize corn, corn farmers increased 
their production in order to keep their incomes stable; second, Mexican farmers knew how to 
grow corn and changing to alternative crops would open them up to all kinds of trade 
regulations and rules as the U.S. and Canada had strict quality standards that would be very 
difficult to meet.  There was also the question of processing, packaging and transportation costs 
of alternatives that the farmers did not currently face while producing corn. Corn was what 
many Mexican farmers knew, and for many it held a deep traditional value that was part of 
their indigenous life.  
 There are distinct groups of farmers in Mexico: 1) large export farmers who are well 
equipped and funded to produce mass quantities of agricultural goods; 2) intermediate farmers 
who grow for local and regional consumption; and 3) small local farmers who consume the 
majority of their crop and only sell what is needed to cover growing and household expenses.  
 Large farms under NAFTA were able to deal with dropping prices by increasing their 
production.  Such farms usually have an excess of land available that they can rotate into 
production when needed.  Large farms that produce for export are more likely to have available 
income to purchase pesticides and fertilizer that can speed and increase their production to keep 
up with the price fluctuations.  One of the biggest problems with the large agricultural 
producers is that when they increase their use of fertilizer and pesticides they also increased 
their destruction of the environment, polluting their own soil as well as surrounding lands, lakes 
and rivers. 
 Intermediate-sized farms more or less maintained their output and were subjected to 
loss or profits. Unlike the large farms, the intermediate farms did not have access to more land 
or money to invest in new pesticides and fertilizers.  The intermediate farmer adjusted to the 
new market conditions by cutting labor.  Cutting labor put more pressure on farmers to produce 
more with less, and the laborers that lost their jobs were forced to look for other employment, 
fueling increased migration. 
 Small farmers suffered the most from NAFTA with its downward pressure on prices 
and the loss of government subsidies.  The sudden drop in corn prices directly affected the 
small farmers by depriving them of the income they needed to continue to farm and take care of 
the basic necessities of their homes and families. While post-NAFTA the domestic price for 
corn has fallen, the price of corn-based foods, especially a Mexican staple the tortilla did not 
decrease; in fact, it has increased 279% according to Pital.   
The reasons for this are twofold: first, and most important, tortilla prices were 
effectively subsidized until 1996, when manufacturers were able to transfer their increased 
costs to consumers. Second, the Mexican tortilla market is a monopoly where basically the two 
large companies control the market and operate like cartels, using their market power to set 
higher prices.  Some small farmers increased their production of corn by taking over land they 
did not own, usually in protected areas and with adverse environmental consequences, such as 
deforestation and soil erosion, so they could meet the rising costs of feeding themselves and 
their families due to tortillas becoming more expensive.   
Following NAFTA, the level of U.S. corn exports to Mexico increased twentyfold. Over 
that same period, the number of corn producers in Mexico declined by one-third from its pre-
1994 level. This finding is highly significant as unemployment is one of the best indicators of 
imminent migration (Pissarides 1990: 12). The poor, urban-bound corn farmers were unable to 
compete with the dropping prices of corn and had no alternative but to migrate out of their rural 
homelands and into urban areas in search of employment.  
The decreasing number of active corn producers in Mexico directly follows the 
declining average price for corn sold in Mexico. 
 Immediately following NAFTA’s trade liberalization, corn prices fell $160 per ton. In 
the ensuing years small corn farmers disappeared at a rapid rate leaving behind many economic  
victims with no money and few choices. U.S. corn subsidies wreaked havoc on the Mexican 
corn producers who were not protected by a government that had no programs in place to help 
them adjust.  These economic disruptions in addition to the elimination of any TRQ were the 
main causes of out-migration from rural Mexico. 
The small corn farmers made their way into cities looking for employment.  The 
problem was that NAFTA failed to create enough manufacturing jobs to employ all the 
incoming migrants who needed work. The migrants in turn were forced to look towards the 
north and cross the border into the U.S. where jobs were more plentiful. It is important to note 
here that as farmers left the rural areas they not only took themselves away but also took away 
the knowledge and local practices of growing diverse strains of corn that had been developed 
by small-scale indigenous farmers. This is very troubling for Mexico because it threatens a long 
history of agricultural knowledge production as well as the survival of the indigenous 
population that makes up many of the rural areas (Pissarides 1990:20).  NAFTA’s opening of 
Mexican markets to cheap, subsidized U.S. corn displaced a large number of Mexican farmers, 
causing an epidemic of social unrest.  In 2003 one of the biggest protests took place against 
NAFTA in Mexico City, where farmers demanded that the Mexican government renegotiate 
the terms of agriculture in NAFTA.   The small Mexican farmer wanted the government to 
enforce the long term development programs and provide investment in programs to help the 
displaced workers acquire new skills.  The newly unemployed farmers wanted their indigenous 
rights to be recognized and for NAFTA to provide assistance to the affected communities.  The 
NAFTA parties did not renegotiate the treaty, but they did provide some financial assistance to 
those most affected and in need.   Even though the protests were not able to get Mexico to 
renegotiate NAFTA, they did shine a light on the plight of the small Mexican farmer that would 
play a big part in the future politics of Mexico.  Opposition to NAFTA has grown in Mexico 
and as years have passed Mexico’s indigenous population has suffered the biggest losses from 
the treaty. 
CORN DUMPING 
  NAFTA allowed U.S. subsidy programs to remain in place, which in turn promoted 
dumping of corn into Mexico well below the cost of production. While U.S. corn exports to 
Mexico were almost all of the yellow corn variety in the mid-1990s, some 20 percent today are 
white corn. Even before the U.S. white corn exports began to increase, the price paid to farmers 
in Mexico for corn fell by over 70 percent as huge amounts of U.S. yellow corn were dumped 
in the Mexican market. In 2001, Mexican farmers produced 18 million tons of corn - 3 million 
of which were left unused (Nadal 2000:5).  U.S. subsidies crippled the small Mexican corn 
farmer as U.S. corn flooded the market.  U.S. subsidies caused prices for yellow corn, used 
primarily for animal feed, to fall drastically and in turn Mexican corn farmers could not sell 
their product to livestock farmers who turned to U.S. corn that could be bought more cheaply, 
in turn increasing profits and or market share for the sellers.  When white corn entered the 
market more havoc was caused because now the Mexican farmer was competing to sell the 
kind of corn used for tortillas that the majority of Mexican families eat as a staple food. 
Yellow and white corns are treated as the same commodity under NAFTA. This policy 
has had serious consequences for Mexican corn growers, as it made it almost impossible to 
maintain price differentials between yellow corn and the normally more expensive white corn.   
In addition, corn buyers in Mexico are attracted to imported U.S. corn by the very favorable 
loan rates available to them through U.S. export agencies. The availability of large amounts of 
U.S. yellow corn, combined with the favorable credit terms, has given a small number of large 
corn purchasers in Mexico tremendous leverage over prices.  Large Mexican corporations, with 
the majority being part owned or at least influenced by U.S. corporations, helped set the price 
of corn to the farmer, driven down through the U.S. subsides. These corporations would 
demand a certain price and if the Mexican farmer could not meet their price they would 
purchase the cheaper U.S. corn  (Nadal 2000:15).   After NAFTA, Mexico began to see tons 
and tons of its corn not being purchased due to increased consumption of cheap U.S. corn.  
While large quantities of U.S. yellow corn are used in Mexico as animal feed, 
substantial amounts are also used in preparing food for human consumption. The growing use 
of yellow corn for human food has led to outrage and mass protests throughout Mexico.  
Mexican activists led a charge against yellow corn for human consumption because it has been 
known to contain carcinogenic substances from the way it is produced.  Food producers began 
substituting yellow corn for white corn increasing health risks from it use (Nadal 2000:8).    
Prior to NAFTA, the white corn that most Mexican farmers grew was priced some 25 
percent higher than yellow corn. By 1996, this price differential had disappeared (Nadal 
2000:5).   Under NAFTA’s terms, Mexico can collect tariffs on corn imports above a certain 
level, but this quota includes both yellow and white corn. So while large-scale protests and 
intense public pressure led the Mexican government to reinstate a NAFTA-permitted above-
quota tariff for imported white corn in December 2003, the Mexican Senate defeated a measure 
to also reinstate tariffs on imported yellow corn (Nadal 2000:7). From the perspective of small 
Mexican farmers NAFTA was not delivering on its promises and now the livelihoods of many 
were in jeopardy. The biggest causality of the dropping corn prices were the small scale 
farmers and the communities they lived in, which saw a growing poverty rate that threatened 
them and their indigenous way of life. Market prices for U.S. corn fail to capture the social 
costs of destroyed indigenous communities, the loss of traditional corn cultivation and the 
overall effect on local communities of future world supplies of food.   
NAFTA and its trade liberalization relied on an inaccurate picture that represented the 
United States as the most efficient corn producer, which in turn harmed health and the 
environment while undermining the livelihoods of small Mexican farmers and their 
communities. The NAFTA agreement was not about comparative advantage, instead providing 
an advantage to the country providing the highest subsidies.  The winners in this free trade 
agreement were the developed country parties who were unchecked in their use of subsidies, as 
opposed to the developing country which did not enjoy the same advantages. 
 It is easy to see the damage that U.S. agricultural subsidies have caused Mexico through 
NAFTA but it is not so simple to eliminate subsidies. Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, were 
economists who argued that the price of primary commodities declines relative to the price of 
manufactured goods over the long term, which causes the terms of trade of primary-product-
based economies to deteriorate.  Specialization in the export of primary commodities can have 
very negative effects for developing countries due to the decline in agricultural commodity 
prices relative to the price of manufactured goods (Gonzales 2011:760). Countries that rely on 
the export of only a couple of agricultural commodities put themselves at a high risk. Countries 
who may be subject to new unfavorable trade agreements like that of NAFTA, in addition to 
fluctuations in the market or a year of bad crops due to weather or disease may encounter 
problems on the international market receiving a fair and sustainable rate of exchange for their 
goods. 
 Another interesting aspect to note is the way developing countries are being required 
through trade agreements to forego government intervention to protect or support national 
industries. The U.S. and other developed countries achieved economic gains through subsidies, 
tariffs and state funding and have always invested and protected their producers.  The U.S. has 
watched over and been careful not to expose certain industries, such as technology, to 
competition in the open market until companies were established strongly enough to survive. It 
is, therefore, ironic that NAFTA requires Mexico to do the opposite of what has worked to 
provide economic prosperity to countries like the U.S. in the past.  
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 The theory of comparative advantage, which plays a central role in grounding the 
NAFTA agreement, is an economic theory about the potential gains from trade for individuals, 
firms, or nations that arise from differences in their endowments of land, labor, capital, and 
entrepreneurial inputs or technological progress.  In this model, an economic actor has a 
comparative advantage over another in producing a particular good if he/she can produce that 
good at a lower relative opportunity cost or at a lower relative marginal cost prior to trade.  One 
does not compare the monetary costs of production or even the resource costs (labor needed per 
unit of output) of production. Instead, one must compare the opportunity costs of producing 
goods across countries.  The principle of comparative advantage holds that under free trade, a 
rational economic actor will produce more of and consume less of a good for which he has a 
comparative advantage.  
David Ricardo developed the classical theory of comparative advantage in 1817 to 
explain why countries engage in international trade even when one country's workers are more 
efficient at producing every single good than workers in other countries. He demonstrated that 
if two countries capable of producing two commodities engage in free market exchange, then 
each country will increase its overall consumption by exporting the good for which it has a 
comparative advantage, while importing the other good, provided that there exist differences in 
labor productivity between the countries (Surannovic 2015: 325).  
 Comparative advantage is important to this discussion because one of NAFTA’s 
initiatives was to bolster participants’ comparative advantage and promote equal shares of the 
market.  The problem was that the U.S. had already put in place high levels of protectionism 
with subsidies that encouraged overproduction that depressed the market prices for agricultural 
commodities.  Comparative advantage, effectively in an erroneous application, was a vital part 
of the NAFTA logic and agreement and was used to persuade Mexico to allow the U.S. entry 
into the corn sector with an assurance that Mexico would make up the difference through their 
comparative advantage in another sector.   In the next section I will examine the NAFTA 
negotiations and use the Mexican corn sector to analyze how NAFTA and the opening up of 
this agricultural commodity sector affected the indigenous population in rural Mexico. 
In NAFTA comparative advantage is a term used loosely.  Intervention by government 
in markets has proven beneficial for developed countries and it has allowed them to prosper.  
With strong economies and protected markets developed countries tend to get the upper hand 
when negotiating with weaker countries. In the NAFTA negotiations Mexico opened up its 
economy but because of weak industrial policy it has failed to protect itself as the U.S. had 
done (Surannovic 2015: 332). Mexico’s growth is largely based on maquiladoras that are 
basically sweat shops where developed countries send their products to be assembled by cheap 
labor, an example being the car industry.  The car industry has many jobs that are filled with 
low-wage, low-skilled workers.  The jobs are a pipeline between the developed countries and 
Mexico, whereas Mexico does not really gain anything because these sectors are not integrally 
linked to the national economy.  Another problem is that other countries like China, Nicaragua 
and India to name a few, compete against Mexico by offering to do the unskilled labor work at 
even lower wages, putting further stress on the Mexican economy.  With Mexico being one of 
the U.S.’s biggest exporters, Mexico took a big hit in their economy with the recession of 2008 
as the U.S. suffered a severe economic downturn that was felt all the way across the border.  
In summary, U.S. subsidies have not helped Mexico in competing in NAFTA.   For 
Mexico to compete with the other developing countries it needs to protect its industries through 
subsidies, tariffs and other policy interventions.  Mexican farmers have been hit hard by 
NAFTA and cannot compete in the current environment.  With NAFTA allowing the U.S. to 
dominate markets with its subsidized commodities and with Mexico waiving the agreement’s 
protectionist clauses has forced the small Mexican farmer out of business and caused a mass 
migration trend that has these farmers heading north for new means of employment. 
Neoliberal thought would suggest that if Mexico’s agricultural sector is shaken by trade 
liberalization as a result of NAFTA, the national economy will be able to adjust to this situation 
because the long term benefits of the agreement will outweigh the short-term disadvantages.  
Mexico has a comparative advantage to the United States in low-wage labor and so trade 
liberalization should increase U.S. demand for Mexico’s labor intensive goods.  This in theory 
should produce more jobs in labor intensive production that the displaced small farmer could 
fill and, if these conditions hold true, wages should increase and migration should decrease. 
NAFTA unfortunately did not produce the results that negotiators had hoped for or 
promised. First, other agricultural sectors, such as mango production, are located in northern 
regions where the soil and climate is suitable.  It is not so easy to tell a farmer in a southern 
area to switch to a crop that will not produce the yield or produce anything compared to the 
corn crop they had farmed.  Second, the Mexican manufacturing sector was not able to grow at 
the pace of the rural migration because of weak industrial policy and competition from other 
countries that were offering their labor more cheaply than Mexico could. Several sectors 
already favored with natural resources, capital, proximity to the U.S. market, and infrastructure 
have grown during the NAFTA years, but they offer very few displaced farmers a viable option 
for employment. Finally, there was a disconnect that thwarted trade benefits because of the 
Green Revolution, structural adjustment and the policies agreed upon in the NAFTA agreement 
(Gonzales 2011: 722).   
NAFTA AND REFORM 
Mexico’s neoliberal economic reforms have backfired. In attempting to modernize the 
agricultural sector of the Mexican economy the reforms have created havoc, and the resulting 
demise of many small farmers has set in motion a mass exodus of rural communities looking 
for new ways to provide for their families. After the debt crisis in the 1980s policies that were 
promoted by the World Bank and the IMF led to a decrease in subsides that began the hardship 
of the rural farmer.  With NAFTA being passed and Mexico being flooded with cheap U.S. 
corn the migration patterns only increased as unemployment skyrocketed in the rural areas. 
Free marketers insist that Mexican agriculture merely needs social programs to assist 
while employment adjustments are made. What these positions fail to account for is how small-
scale corn production has been a central part of rural society for centuries and is more than just 
a core economic activity. Comparative advantage does not take into account rural-to urban 
migration and the cultural disintegration it has caused farming communities. Trying to 
reconcile the social realities of this corn centered economy, based on cultural preservation, 
subsistence, and small-scale sustainable agriculture with the free trade model of comparative 
advantages is an uphill battle to say the least. When Mexican farmers demand new rural 
policies and a new pact between the state and rural society, they are demanding that the non-
market contributions of the small farming economy be recognized as essential to food 
sovereignty, cultural diversity, environment conservation, and rural employment. 
NAFTA has flooded the Mexican market with low-cost monoculture corn thereby 
reducing the economic value of rural farmers’ corn, which has a genetic diversity cultivated 
over many years and useful in resisting certain environmental conditions and greatly lowering 
the risk of crop failure. Under this kind of free trade valuation, farmers’ stewardship of corn 
diversity goes largely unrewarded, as trade liberalization brings into the market genetically 
uniform strains of corn susceptible to disease and poor environmental conditions [SOURCE?].  
Market integration promotes specialization and an exclusive focus on high-yield 
varieties, as national markets become dominated by low-priced imports from the agricultural 
surpluses of the largest producers. This leads to the loss of local varieties as well as minor 
crops. Globalization also replaces local cultural traditions with modern preferences; wheat 
bread supplants the market for corn tortillas in Mexico, while imported corn flour further 
displaces flour made from traditional corn varieties within the national tortilla market. 
Livelihood pressures lead to the need for off-farm employment to supplement incomes. This 
results in declining attention to traditional farming, and often to wholesale migration and the 
abandonment of farming altogether (Almekinders 2001:22).  So as the world becomes more 
integrated tradition is left to the side as new forms production take over the market that yield 
more profitable results without weighing the human and social costs. 
In the Mexican case it is very dangerous to leave the fate of Mexican corn to market 
forces. Corn biodiversity is undervalued in the current market, and as the markets have shown 
it is also unprotected. As Mexico’s biodiverse corn goes unprotected and the market 
undervalues it eventually economic pressures will push the farmer out of his land, and these 
long developed strains of corn will soon fade out and be forgotten with consequences 
devastating to some rural Mexican communities. 
 NAFTA’s effects have been the antithesis of free trade efficiency through comparative 
advantage. NAFTA let the economically stronger take advantage of the weaker parties to the 
agreement.  Moreover, NAFTA did not take into account the social and environmental costs of 
the treaty.  The new breed of monocultural corn from the U.S. that Mexico was now using 
caused soil erosion whose effects are irreversible. Mexican farmers were also being made to 
use chemicals to fertilize their crops, polluting the air and in certain areas causing water 
pollution from runoff of chemicals into water supplies. Eliminating trade barriers was supposed 
to create efficiency by identifying the low cost producer but instead this treaty made everyone 
worse off by manipulating the market that led not only to economic failure but also created an 
increased harm to the environment and the health of the people of these farming communities. 
 The comparative advantage theory assumes that everyone is competing fairly and does 
not provide for domination of the trade sector by a select number of transnational corporations. 
According to Bill Vorley of International Institute for Environment and Development, two 
corporations control seventy-five percent of the grain trade. Six agrochemical companies 
control 75 percent of global agrochemical sales. Ten corporations control 67 percent of 
proprietary seed sales, nearly 90 percent of the agrochemical market, and 40 percent of retail 
grocery sales. Similar market concentrations exist for other commodities, including coffee, tea, 
sugar, cocoa and bananas. Transnational corporations are able to manipulate and dictate the 
markets that enable them to keep market prices low squeezing the small farmers out of the 
market because the prices that are being paid for the crops are two low to live on Vorley 
2016:1).  
 Corporate control often involves several aspects of a given market.  An example can be 
seen with tortillas.  With the price of corn being driven down you would expect the price of 
products made with corn also to decrease; however this was not the case with tortillas.  There 
are two companies that control 97 percent of the corn flour market in Mexico (Nadal 2000:26). 
Tortilla prices increased with NAFTA as these companies were able to set their own prices and 
without competition from the small farmer there was nothing in their way to stop them.  These 
companies are integrated with the agro companies so that at every stage of production the deck 
becomes stacked in favor of the larger corporations.  
 Finally, transnational agricultural companies are able to use their size, power and 
international positions to gain information that the small farmers cannot access.  With their 
cadres of investors, lawyers, and accountants these transnational companies have access to 
information of markets, and they are able to manipulate and use these markets to their 
advantage to increase their profits.  The small Mexican farmers cannot compete in this 
environment and as the larger companies get bigger the small farmers find themselves unable to 
compete in the market. 
 In conclusion, comparative advantage is not allowed to function as it should and 
therefore distorts the market with manipulated information.  The NAFTA agreement has failed 
the small farmer and has sided with large agribusiness.  Mexico has been sold an agreement 
that relies on comparative advantage but because of subsides and the market strength of the 
U.S., Mexico’s small farmers are being pushed out of the market as large agribusiness takes 
over and floods the market with cheaper and plentiful agricultural goods.  
 
PART TWO 
NAFTA AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 NAFTA has proven to be a bad deal for Mexico and as shown in the previous section, 
the logic of comparative advantage that promised greater prosperity through free trade never 
came to fruition. An agreement cannot be enforced if it does not take into account 
environmental, social and economic conditions.  In this section I will look at an environmental 
justice approach to trade agreements and show through the Zapatista movement how social 
unrest that arises from denial of such justice concerns that can devastate a community and 
country. 
 Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. An 
environmental justice approach to trade policy must insure that international trade is regulated 
and that all parties involved are treated fairly.  NAFTA did not treat all the parties fairly, and it 
was the indigenous who suffered the most from the treaty. 
 One issue that environmental justice seeks to address is that of environmental 
discrimination. Discrimination against the Mexican indigenous in NAFTA was due to the 
treaty’s unfair rules that allowed dominant factions to flex their superiority, often resulting in 
special privileges for the dominant group and the mistreatment of non-dominant minorities.  
The combined impact of these privileges and prejudices meant that small communities and 
farmers were subject to new agro governance that led to harmful conditions that will damage 
the land for years to come.  
 Mexico’s geography and history raise challenges related to food security and agriculture 
that have only been heightened since NAFTA’s implementation. There is poverty all over the 
world, often accompanied by the misconception that poverty comes from food scarcity. Based 
upon economist Amartya Sen's pioneering study of famine and on the World Bank's influential 
1986 report on world hunger, it is now widely accepted that lack of access to food rather than 
inadequate supply is the primary cause of hunger.  People go hungry because they are poor and 
lack the money and resources to get food. There is also data from the World Bank that states 
that 75 percent of poor people in third world countries come from rural areas. People living in 
rural areas have limited resources and many go into farming out of necessity.  These small 
farmers then are affected when any outside seller comes in and provides food at cheaper prices 
that undercuts the small farmer who now is not making money selling his crops on the market.  
So one of the questions to be asked is: should the developed countries be responsible for human 
rights and extraterritorial harm that results from their economic governance? 
 The NAFTA trade agreement has posed many challenges.  NAFTA has allowed the 
U.S. to dump its agro products on Mexico and force trade liberalization on the country that it 
was not ready or able to handle.  In an environmental justice approach trade policy would be 
scrutinized to insure that participants of the agreement were not being taken advantage of, 
economically or environmentally.  In the case of NAFTA, this careful scrutiny either did not 
occur or the U.S. has not been held accountable for the damage it has, in fact, caused Mexico.  
Through NAFTA Mexico has suffered human rights and environmental damage that will 
continue to affect the Mexican economy and society of many years to come.  
 Another objective of environmental justice is to see that environmental resources are 
distributed equally so that no one community will be adversely affected by any environmental 
disaster. Environmental justice views the environment as a social good rather than as a 
commodity.  In this view the environment needs to be allocated equitably so no one community 
is too burdened with the risks and rewards, and international trade policy plays a pivotal role in 
distributing both economic and environmental risks and rewards. Under NAFTA this means 
understanding how the fundamental inequality between the U.S. and Mexico creates a treaty 
that assigns risks and rewards through a calculation of power, not justice.   
 NAFTA failed to be equitable for Mexico and did not take into account the economic 
and environmental risks that the country would endure. The U.S. has a great deal of influence 
over Mexico and wielded this power to reach a deal that benefited the U.S. more than it 
benefited Mexico.  From an environmental justice stand point Mexico was not treated fairly 
and gave up too much too soon.  Timelines put on corn production were hurried; causing U.S. 
subsidized corn to flood the market that caused the small farmers to be driven out of business.   
Mexican communities were overlooked under NAFTA as profit and mass production took 
precedence, disrupting the settled societies of rural Mexico, including the displacement of 
indigenous communities from the lands they once worked (Krooth 1995:34). 
 Advocates for environmental justice have preached the importance of giving countries 
and affected communities all the information that is needed to understand risks and to allow the 
persons that will be affected the opportunity to discuss and decide whether agreements are 
beneficial and acceptable.  It is important in the future that environmental justice is practiced 
from inception to implementation in trade agreements to insure that communities do not suffer 
human rights and environmental degradation at the hands of corporations looking to exploit 
agreements for monetary gains (Krooth 1995:37). . 
 
NAFTA AND THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT 
As mentioned above, a crucial inflection point in the story of NAFTA has been the 
uprising of peasants in Chiapas under the name Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(EZLN) or Zapatistas for short.  NAFTA was the main reason this uprising took place and can 
be seen as the straw that broke the camel’s back.  The Zapatista Army went public on January 
1, 1994, the day when NAFTA went into effect. On that day, the Zapatistas issued their First 
Declaration and Revolutionary Laws from the jungles of Chiapas. The declaration amounted to 
a declaration of war on the Mexican government, which the Zapatistas considered so out of 
touch with the will of the people as to make it illegitimate. The Zapatista declaration stressed 
that it opted for armed struggle due to the lack of results achieved through peaceful means of 
protest.  The peasants in Chiapas tried many forms of non-violent protest at first trying to 
express their plight through sit-ins, hunger strikes and marches but nothing seemed to draw any 
attention or success to their cause.  
EZLN’s initial goal was to instigate a revolution throughout Mexico, but because of the 
movement’s relative size and lack of resources this never came to fruition. The EZLN decided 
to use their uprising as a platform to call the world's attention to the problematic signing of 
NAFTA.  The EZLN feared the treaty would devastate the peasant communities and bring even 
a further wealth gap between the rich and the poor. The EZLN also called for greater 
democratization of the Mexican government, which had been controlled by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) for 65 years, and for land reform mandated by the 1917 Constitution 
of Mexico but largely ignored by the PRI (O’Neil 2006:377). The EZLN did not demand 
independence from Mexico but rather autonomy that would allow the peasants to take control 
of their resources and destiny. 
On the morning of January 1, 1994, an estimated 3,000 armed Zapatista insurgents 
seized towns and cities in Chiapas and freed the prisoners in the jail of San Cristóbal de las 
Casas and set fire to several police buildings and military barracks in the area. This insurgency 
gave the Zapatistas hope that they could get what they wanted through force, but the armed 
rebellion was to be short lived as the following day the Mexican army counterattacked the 
Zapatista guerrillas and forced them to retreat back into the jungle.  The EZLN faced an uphill 
battle with their uprising, but because of their fierce determination and nothing-to-lose attitude 
the EZLN kept fighting for their rights and self-determination. 
Armed clashes in Chiapas ended on January 12, with a ceasefire brokered by the 
Catholic diocese in San Cristóbal de las Casas.  The Zapatistas retained some of the land for a 
little over a year, but in February 1995 the Mexican army attacked the EZLN in a surprise 
breach of ceasefire, retaking land from the Zapatistas. Following this offensive, the Zapatista 
villages were mostly abandoned, and the rebels fled to the mountains after breaking out of the 
Mexican army perimeter. 
The Mexican army continually tried to capture the Zapatista guerrillas and their 
commanders.  The guerrillas knew the jungle of their homeland well and made it difficult for 
the Mexican army to find them.  After some time the Mexican army was unable to defeat the 
guerrillas so the Mexican government decided to pursue a policy of negotiation. The EZLN 
were led by a very charismatic man who went by the name of sub-comandante Marcos.  Sub-
comandante Marcos developed a media campaign through numerous media outlets that brought 
the movement worldwide attention. Sub-comandante Marcos ran the EZLN from the Lacandon 
Jungle in Chiapas and made a series of declarations to the Mexican government on behalf of 
the peasants. The declarations were non-violent attempts to achieve rights for the peasants of 
Chiapas through political channels. A very important agreement was signed with the Sixth 
Declaration. 
On June 28, 2005, the Zapatistas presented the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon 
Jungle that declared the EZLN rights and future for the peasants of Chiapas.  This declaration 
outlines and establishes support for the indigenous peoples, who make up roughly one-third of 
the population of Chiapas and extends the cause to include "all the exploited and dispossessed 
of Mexico." It also expresses the movement's sympathy to the international alter-globalization 
movement and offered to provide material aid to those in Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
elsewhere, with whom they had a common cause. The declaration ended with an exhortation 
for all who have more respect for humanity than for money to join with the Zapatistas in the 
struggle for social justice both in Mexico and abroad. The declaration called for an alternative 
national campaign as an alternative to the presidential campaign. In preparation for this 
campaign, the Zapatistas invited to their territory over 600 national leftist organizations, 
indigenous groups, and non-governmental organizations in order to listen to their claims for 
human rights in a series of biweekly meetings that culminated in a plenary meeting on 
September 16, the day Mexico celebrates its independence from Spain. In this meeting, Sub-
comandante Marcos requested official adherence of the organizations to the Sixth Declaration, 
and detailed a six-month tour of the Zapatistas through all 31 Mexican states, to occur 
concurrently with the electoral campaign starting January 2006 (O’Neil 2006:378). Other 
groups in Chiapas, such as the pacifist Las Abejas, supported many of the goals of the Zapatista 
Revolution without condoning the use of violence to achieve those goals. A strong international 
Internet presence prompted numerous international left-wing groups to support the Zapatista 
movement. 
When President Vicente Fox, the first non-PRI president of Mexico in over 70 years, 
took the presidency in 2001, the Zapatistas marched on Mexico City to present their case to the 
Mexican Congress. Although Fox had stated earlier that he could end the conflict "in fifteen 
minutes," the EZLN rejected watered-down agreements and created 32 "autonomous 
municipalities" in Chiapas, thus partially implementing their demands without government 
support but with some funding from international organizations (O’Neil 2006:378). The 
extraordinarily complex and rich history of political discussion and organizing in Chiapas from 
the 1970s to the 1990s produced something genuinely original, a New Leftist language and 
vision that includes negotiation about what it means to be Indian within a larger Mexican 
nation. It includes discussion about new forms of democracy and an inventiveness regarding 
civil society, exemplified by the convention in the jungle when the Zapatistas asked people 
around the nation to comment and vote and by the accords on Indian autonomy hammered out 
with government negotiators in 1996.  
The struggle of the Zapatistas for the indigenous of Chiapas was a very important 
movement that showed the economic injustice that was being forced upon the indigenous of the 
country.  The Zapatistas were fighting against NAFTA and showing the world that the treaty 
was unfair and causing great harm and displacement to certain communities within Mexico.  
NAFTA included many policies that went against an ethos of allowing communities to survive 
and develop in their own way with their own traditions. 
 
MEXICO AND LAND SCARCITY 
Many of the agricultural policies implemented under NAFTA have undermined food 
sovereignty in Chiapas, particularly in terms of self-determination of production and 
consumption. There have been three major environmental justice issues that have negatively 
affected Chiapas and caused the most destruction on poor, rural indigenous communities: land 
security, food security, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and monocultures.. 
Clearly, issues of oppression, most often through race and class, are structural, embedded in 
and permeating all levels of society (Maiki 2001:22). They are at the root of numerous 
environmental problems in Mexico, almost all of which spring out of land insecurity.  
 
Mexico has a long history of resource and environmental injustice.  A great part of 
Mexico’s history shows an unbalanced distribution of land.  Mexico’s government, throughout 
the nation’s existence has been built on the elite holding power, creating a system that favored 
the rich and exploited the indigenous.  NAFTA to the Zapatistas was an extension of 
government politics as usual, where the elite favored the elite.  The Zapatistas’ fears were 
realized as economic policies that came out of NAFTA took away small farmers’ land and 
replaced it with large scale producers that put profit over human rights.  Even ejido land 
became too expensive to farm and soon that land too was taken over by big agribusiness. 
(Villarreal 2010: 22).  
Since the implementation of NAFTA and the privatization of ejido land, many of the 
small farmers have chosen to sell or rent their land to these businesses as a source of income. 
Consequently, they frequently become day laborers, working their own rented-out land as the 
majority of profits and benefits are going to large-scale agribusinesses, either the Mexican 
upper class or foreign investors, rather than to the actual farmers who have been struggling for 
their land rights for centuries. To further complicate the issue of land scarcity, much of the land 
that is available for small-scale farming is being degraded through poor agricultural practices. 
Slash-and-burn clearing and the overharvesting of wood as a fuel source are just a couple of 
examples of land degradation. These practices and the resulting land degradation, while often 
carried out by small farmers, are informed by the socioeconomic systems in Mexico and of 
NAFTA. The marginalization of the rural poor was driven by their inability to integrate into the 
economic system and through increased competition that resulted from free trade and in turn 
has put a huge burden on the indigenous who find it almost impossible to compete under 
NAFTA. As a result, these communities have begun using traditional practices like slash and-
burn at a rate that is unsustainable, leading to loss of nutrients in the soil, deforestation, and 
erosion of the land that they once took pride in protecting.  The irony of this situation is that the 
small farmer is the one to take the blame for destroying the environment when it is the 
economic policies that have left them few options for surviving on their own land.  
The Zapatistas feared that low corn prices and elimination of governmental policy and 
subsidies would destroy the small farm industry pushing the indigenous out of their land, 
migrating north to the U.S.  The Zapatistas fears were validated, and after NAFTA was signed 
the indigenous of Chiapas were unable to compete in the new market and forced to look for 
other opportunities to make a living (Villarreal 2010: 32). 
 
NAFTA AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Zapatistas are an example of an environmental justice movement that brought 
attention to the plight of the indigenous and showed firsthand the damage that NAFTA was 
doing to this community.  These movements have taken place in many developing countries 
and they are one of the few ways that the poor in these countries can bring attention to adverse 
effects of trade liberalization.  
An environmental justice approach to trade policy must begin with all parties looking to 
see how human rights are being affected.  More powerful countries need to step up and work on 
trade agreements that are fair to all parties and not vehicles that exploit weaker parties in order 
to achieve greater financial gain. The history of many nations is one of dominance where the 
stronger and richer groups subjugate the weaker groups, keeping them down and allowing them 
little access to change their situation.  The world is changing and technology has allowed once 
isolated situations to be brought out of the shadows and posted to the internet for all to see.  
There have been two arguments that have been traditionally advanced to justify the hierarchical 
superiority of human right norms according to Carmen Gonzales.   
First, as members of the Organization of the United Nations (UN), all states have 
pledged to “take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization” to promote 
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (U.N. Charter, arts. 1(3), 55–56, 59). 
Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that the obligations of UN member states under the 
UN Charter shall prevail in the event of a conflict with obligations under any other 
international agreement. It logically follows that obligations under trade agreements must be 
set aside to the extent that they conflict with human rights norms. 
Second, human rights law is hierarchically superior to obligations flowing from trade 
agreements because it is premised on the natural law notion of the inherent dignity and worth 
of every individual and is therefore not subject to compromise in the pursuit of other social 
objectives, including economic efficiency (Gonzales 2011:777).  Unlike trade agreements, 
human rights treaties do not involve reciprocal exchanges of obligations among contracting 
states. Rather, human rights norms are designed to codify the fundamental rights that groups 
and individuals possess by virtue of their humanity. The insuperable nature of human rights 
claims and their recognition in a variety of human rights conventions and other legal 
instruments require the interpretation of trade law in a manner that promotes human rights. If 
we look at NAFTA we clearly see that the treaty failed to give priority to human rights and 
caused the rights of the Chiapas ingenious to be trumped by the treaty’s economic provisions, 
leading to loss of community, land and wealth.  Human rights should be at the forefront of 
any trade agreement and be a guaranty that people’s freedoms and autonomy will be 
respected. 
One of the solutions Carmen Gonzales proposes for protecting human rights is to 
incorporate an explicit hierarchy of norms into trade agreements (Gonzales 2011:778).  By 
including a hierarchy of norms clause in trade agreements and declaring that human rights 
will prevail in the event of a conflict between treaty norms, allowing greater protection for 
natural resources, including air and water that are the rights of all people and should take 
precedence in any trade agreement.   If countries agree to this hierarchy of norms clause it 
could be good for all parties of an agreement.  Weaker countries will be able to give their 
citizens a guarantee that they will not be taken advantage of and lose their human and 
environmental rights, while stronger countries can possibly have access to trade with 
countries that would not consider participation because they felt they and their citizens would 
be taken advantage of. For trade agreements to conform to an environmental justice ethic 
flexibility and room for making exceptions need to be built into the treaties.  
Under international law indigenous peoples are protected and guaranteed fundamental 
human rights.  International law under the United Nations represents the universal recognition 
that basic rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human beings, inalienable and 
equally applicable to everyone, and that every one of us is born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. Whatever our nationality, place of residence, gender, national or ethnic origin, color, 
religion, language, or other status, the international community has endorsed an idea and 
system of law that imagines justice for all. 
How does international law protect human rights? International human rights law lays 
down obligations which states are bound to respect. By becoming parties to international 
treaties, states assume obligations and duties under international law to respect, protect and 
achieve human rights.  The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from 
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect 
requires states to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation 
to fulfil means that states must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human 
rights (Gonzales 2011:781). . 
Through ratification of international human rights treaties, Governments should 
undertake to put into place domestic measures and legislation necessary to achieve their treaty 
obligations and duties. The domestic legal system, therefore, provides the principal legal 
protection of human rights guaranteed under international law. Where domestic legal 
proceedings fail to address human rights abuses, mechanisms and procedures for individual 
and group complaints are available at the regional and international levels to help ensure that 
international human rights standards are indeed respected, implemented, and enforced at the 
local level.  So under international law people affected by NAFTA should have their rights 
protected through meaningful procedures and institutions. 
The indigenous of Mexico under international law, as stated above, should have rights 
to their lands and resources where they live and the right to determine their own economic 
development and be consulted and participate in any agreements that will affect their land and 
rights.  In the case of NAFTA the indigenous were forced to leave their land by takeover and 
by the fact of low priced agricultural imports that flooded the market and made the indigenous 
unable to compete in the market.  There were some safeguards put into NAFTA to slow the 
transition of cheap agricultural imports but in the case of corn they were not followed, which 
allowed cheap corn to flood the market almost immediately, sending shockwaves through 
Mexican indigenous communities.   
One reason that human rights were overlooked and provisions were violated was that 
Mexico was pressured at every step of the way to take whatever was offered to them in the 
NAFTA treaty.  If Mexico refused to accept the terms under which the U.S. operated they 
would be threatened with exclusion from the agreement so the Mexican architects in the 
agreement took what was offered without offering any resistance.  The Mexican government 
felt that any treaty was better for them than no treaty at all.  This raises serious questions 
when countries are bullied into signing an agreement because they want to participate in that 
agreement with the hope they will reap some benefits that will outweigh the negatives aspects 
of the treaty.  Though the NAFTA treaty was good for some it was definitely not good for all, 
and the persons who suffered most were the indigenous who were not given any special 
considerations under the NAFTA agreement.  The Mexican government is as much to blame 
for human rights violations as the U.S. has been. 
Mexico is run by the elite and the elite have a history of looking down at the other 
classes as uneducated and barbaric.  With NAFTA the rights of the indigenous were not a 
great concern to anyone.  Big agribusiness and the Mexican government looked at profit and 
what would benefit their interests.  Indigenous land was a prize that big companies sought to 
control and use for their own financial gains.  The Mexican government was more concerned 
with how NAFTA would affect the rights of workers who would have easier access to the 
United States at the border and the human rights of Mexican workers within the U.S. (Krooth 
1995:47) In the negotiations of NAFTA the Mexican government wanted to gain better rights 
for people who lived or worked within the U.S.  The Mexican government fought for better 
protection against abuse of Mexicans at the border and inside the United States.  
President Salinas also asked the U.S. not to hunt down alleged criminals inside 
Mexico to bring back to the U.S. for criminal prosecution, regardless of where the alleged 
crimes were committed.   NAFTA did establish some common policies that affected labor and 
the environment, but it was superficial to the agreement and quickly dismissed by many as 
inadequate. There was also a growing inter-relation of human rights conditions from country 
to country, but the parties focused on the economic provisions leaving a lot of the human 
rights issues buried in the background.  Looking back from NAFTA’s initiation until now we 
see that human rights were really not given the precedence they deserved, and in future 
agreements the need for a common human rights enforcement policy is necessary as a 
reflection of the growing global inter-relationship of countries on every economic, political, 
social, and legal level. NAFTA significantly speeds up this process and the need for full 
partnership in the inter-American system of human rights becomes ever more pressing. 
NAFTA, as it was proposed, created a binding enforcement mechanism for violations 
of the new international trade law. The agreement of Canada, Mexico and the United States to 
such binding enforcement mechanisms under NAFTA made clear that enforcement of 
international law would be supported when governments have the political will to do so. The 
problem arose when Canada, Mexico and the United States did not adopt a mechanism to 
enforce their international human rights obligations. In the case of the people of Chiapas there 
were clearly human right offenses and it was demonstrated that the indigenous peoples did not 
have a mechanism to help them but instead had to resort to violence and protest to get 
someone to pay attention to their plight. In order to demonstrate a commitment to the 
enforcement of human rights, the North American partners should have agreed to the binding 
enforcement of international human rights law that allowed any group that felt violated to 
have an avenue for relief and redress of their rights grievances. 
The indigenous of Chiapas tried to get the Mexican legal system to help them but it 
did not, which demonstrates the ongoing importance of enforcement of international human 
rights through domestic courts. The domestic courts failed to provide the people of Chiapas 
with help for the abuses they faced under NAFTA. As another source of rights protection and 
complaint process an international mechanism that could provide for independent oversight is 
needed to assure the consistent protection of human rights.  
In addition to guaranteeing international human rights, future agreements need to 
create a system that offers a mechanism for the broad possible enforcement of violations to 
the agreement. The current treaty could establish a new human rights clause that would allow 
a third party to conduct on-site human rights investigations within each country without 
restrictions, giving them the authority to issue binding decisions, enforcing international law 
for the protection of human rights.  In regards to environmental justice, trade agreements need 
to afford developing countries flexibility to protect the lands, livelihoods and resources of 
indigenous rural communities. Developing countries have sought protection in the WTO 
negotiations, seeking to impose higher tariffs, import restrictions and subsidies that would 
protect food and rural development and exclude some imports that would have a direct effect 
on some communities. 
In conclusion all the solutions mentioned to improve people’s rights in treaties can 
help to provide protectionist measures to agreements, but they will prove to be useless unless 
countries apply their political will to implement them.  NAFTA has many examples where 
policy makers failed to implement safeguards to help communities adapt to the changes that 
the treaty brought, but one that was especially disastrous was the fifteen year transition period 
for the phase out of corn tariffs that was written in the agreement to protect the small farmers 
from the devastating impact of U.S. corn dumping.  Mexico’s government could have 
imposed higher duty fees on U.S. corn, since it was heavily subsidized, which might have 
alleviated some of the burden to Mexico’s own small corn producers.   Mexico’s government 
could have also provided greater support through higher subsidies to its own farmers. There 
was no comparative advantage at work in the corn sector because the U.S. corn was so 
heavily subsidized that even a more efficient Mexican farmer could never compete in a sector 
that was so skewed in favor of the U.S.  Lacking help from any party to the agreement left the 
indigenous little options but to form an opposition party that would draw some kind of 
attention to their plight.  
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGAMS 
All parties to a trade agreement have a right to uphold the rights of all people involved 
in the agreement. One way to address the violations that NAFTA has caused is by Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
have promoted.  SAPs are economic policies for developing countries that have been 
promoted by the World Bank and IMF since the early 1980s as conditions of loans. Structural 
adjustment loans are loans made by the World Bank. They are designed to encourage the 
structural adjustment of an economy by, for example, removing “excess” government controls 
and promoting market competition as part of the neo-liberal agenda followed by the Bank. 
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility is an IMF financing mechanism to support 
macroeconomic policies and SAPs in low-income countries through loans or low interest 
subsidies. 
SAPs reflect the neo-liberal ideology that drives globalization. They aim to achieve 
long-term or accelerated economic growth in poorer countries by restructuring the economy 
and reducing government intervention. SAPs include currency devaluation, managed balance 
of payments, reduction of government services through public spending cuts, budget deficit 
cuts, reducing tax on high earners, reducing inflation, wage suppression, privatization, lower 
tariffs on imports and tighter monetary policy, increased free trade, cuts in social spending, 
and business deregulation. Governments are also encouraged or forced to reduce their role in 
the economy by privatizing state-owned industries, including the health sector, and opening 
up their economies to foreign competition (Gonzales 2011:785).  
Substantially re-purposed adjustment assistance through SAPs could enable Mexico to 
reinvest in its own agricultural sector.  Such re-purposing could target indigenous 
communities and protect natural resources that the communities rely on for subsistence.  
Neoliberal economic policies of the recent past have hurt the rural populations of Mexico.  By 
applying SAPs to act as a vector of social and environmental justice Mexico could get some 
relief from heavily subsidized corn while also providing education, credit, insurance and 
marketing assistance, making investing in their own agricultural sector a top priority.   
Adjustment assistance of this kind could benefit not only the rural communities but also the 
urban communities. 
If rural communities could benefit from SAPs to help prop up the agricultural sector 
then in turn their gain will carry over to the urban centers where new commerce will be 
needed. Adjustment assistance in urban areas would provide financing for infrastructure and 
help develop new businesses that would service the small farmers and provide environmental 
protection.   The new businesses would act on behalf of the farmers to improve environmental 
standards and in turn it would strengthen support for the protection of the rural farmers.  Not 
only Mexico would benefit from adjustment assistance but also the U.S. 
If adjustment assistance improves and strengthens the agricultural sector in Mexico, 
then the U.S. would also benefit because it would make small farm agriculture profitable.  If 
the small farmers are able to make a sustainable living then it would reduce the economic 
incentive for migration.  The U.S. has a longstanding battle with Mexico over illegal 
migration into its country from Mexico.  If citizens of Mexico are given the opportunity to 
make a living wage in their own country then they will stay in their country.  Common 
misperceptions in the U.S. lead to criminalization of unauthorized immigrants and to the 
building of walls and militarization of borders, when in reality the U.S. should be finding 
ways to help the citizens inside Mexico find ways to increase employment and make a decent 
living in their own country. 
LEGAL REFORMS 
As NAFTA has illustrated trade agreements that have been based on comparative 
advantage are not always even-handed and can result in human and environmental rights 
harm.  In the case of NAFTA comparative advantage neglected to take into account subsidies 
on corn that worked against the theory.  Market prices and social costs were not taken into 
account in the agreement and none of the small farmers affected by the treaty were asked for 
input. Considering the mistakes of NAFTA future agreements should involve some legal 
reform that protects participants from future environmental and human rights damage.  The 
time to start accessing environmental and human rights concerns is at the beginning of 
developing a treaty.  In the development of a treaty human rights assessments should be 
conducted early and responsibly and should include extensive public participation.  
Environmental impact assessment emerged as a regulatory tool in the United States 
with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and has since been 
`adopted by most countries and international organizations (Gonzales 2011:778).   These 
assessments can benefit communities that may be adversely affected by a trade agreement by 
giving time to assess and ensure that any impacts of agreements are fully understood before 
any final decisions are made and that all parties that may be affected have been consulted and 
participated in the decision. 
The United States does have Executive Order 13,141 (1999) that requires the U.S. to 
do an environmental review of all trade agreements.  The problem with this Order is that it is 
only mandatory to look at effects of environmental impact within the United States; the order 
does not make mandatory the environmental impact on other countries.  Executive Order 
13,141 also does not provide for any external protection of human rights or provide any 
assessment or periodic review of the effects of an agreement.  The agreements are also 
immune from having to release any information or drafts of any agreements to the public for 
review. The fear of this could be that something negative may be exposed in the agreement 
that might cause the agreement to get shelved, which could put the treaty in jeopardy of ever 
being signed.  Executive Order 13,141 does not take into account the rights of different races, 
gender or ethnic origin and it does not allow for any direct action against parties who break or 
abuse any part of the treaty.  
Executive Order 13,141 does have its flaws but it can be a starting point for 
governance that includes environmental and human rights assessment and protection that take 
into account every party that is involved.  A new regime could also implement some kind of 
protection against commercial interests hijacking agreements for financial gain, making the 
negotiations open to the public to all parties making the process transparent.  Including the 
public and especially the rural and indigenous communities in the negotiations will assure that 
the assessment that is being conducted is one that is fair and has the experience and input of 
the people most affected by the agreement.  Participation by all parties of the agreement will 
make the agreement seem more legitimate due to the fact that everyone was included in the 
process of developing the treaty. 
Another safeguard to performing assessments would be to require periodic evaluations 
of environmental and human rights to assure that the agreement have not caused any undue 
harm on areas or communities of the agreement. It is important to continue to check if parties 
to the agreement are affected negatively and, if they are, to immediately address the issue and 
implement a plan to alleviate any ill effects. 
In regards to NAFTA, if there was an opportunity for communities to participate in the 
development of the treaty, then attention to negative externalities of corn production in the 
U.S. as compared to Mexico may have been brought to the forefront and dealt with 
accordingly.  If the public had been allowed to participate in NAFTA negotiations, they 
would have had the opportunity to put pressure on the deciding parties and had a chance to 
correct harm before it had the opportunity to take hold.  In the United States corn production 
has been linked to many environmental and human health risks.  U.S. corn production causes 
harm to the environment through water, soil and air pollution from the vast array of 
insecticides that are used in the production process.  There is also the human health risk that 
comes in the form of high fructose corn syrup that comes for U.S. corn production.  High 
fructose corn syrup has been linked to obesity and type II diabetes and has found its way into 
many food products consumed in the U.S.  In contrast the Mexican corn production by small 
rural farmers provides a positive environmental and human health to the community.  The 
small indigenous farmers in Mexico rarely use pesticides from harmful chemicals, eliminating 
any water, soil and air risks.  The corn grown is not sold to big business to be made into high 
fructose corn syrup but instead is grown for personal consumption or sold to be made into 
tortillas.  If these issues had been brought out at the inception of NAFTA, then the parties may 
have been able to address these issues and draw attention to this cause that might have had 
some effect on agribusiness to reform its growth and use of corn. 
The U.S. should change its agricultural practices.  Large agribusiness has made itself 
almost exempt from being held accountable for its business practices.  Reform needs to take 
place so everyone is on an even playing field.  U.S. corn subsidies should be eliminated and 
redirected to more sustainable farming practices.  In Mexico small farmers should be 
rewarded for their environmentally sound growing practices.  Rewards in the form of money 
could come from a tariff put on the importation of U.S. corn and be allocated to small farmers 
who have shown to be making social and environmental contributions in the agricultural 
sector. Implementing these changes would help to preserve small indigenous farmers’ 
livelihood, and it would also promote a global good to show the significance of good 
agriculture and social practice. 
 
FIXING INEQUALITY 
Globalization is the tendency of businesses, technologies, or philosophies to spread 
throughout the world, and for some countries it is difficult to keep up with the fast paced 
changes. The global economy is characterized as a totally interconnected marketplace, 
unhampered by time zones or national boundaries. Whether or not the establishment of the 
global marketplace will be beneficial is in dispute, but it is happening and the effect of 
globalization on the world is still being measured. Proponents believe that globalization has 
the potential to create greater opportunities for growth throughout the world, benefiting the 
developed nations while leveling the playing field everywhere else; opponents of 
globalization believe that it will merely increase the opportunities for the wealthier nations to 
take advantage of the poorer ones and, furthermore, could eradicate regional diversity and 
lead to a homogenized world culture.  An environmental approach to globalization seeks to 
reduce structural inequities so there is an even playing field created and weaker countries can 
compete with more advanced countries.  NAFTA, an agreement based on comparative 
advantage, was not equal for all and relegated Mexico deeper into poverty by pushing an 
agenda that was economically and environmentally unfair.   
An environmental justice approach to trade policy and equality must take into account 
every landscape including but not limited to social, economic and environmental conditions in 
participating countries. Trade pacts should be bound by a right to development that allows 
countries to develop and prosper, eliminating obstacles that would otherwise hinder their 
progress. International development policies need to be established collectively and 
individually so that there are a set of guidelines that are followed to insure that developing 
countries are given the chance to prosper from trade agreements and not suffer. 
The 1947 GATT agreement was perceived to favor wealthy countries over poor ones 
because it required reduction in tariffs on manufactured goods while permitting industrialized 
countries to limit or exclude textiles, clothing, and agricultural product from developing 
countries according to Gonzales.  Developing countries did try to fight these inequities by 
joining together to demand fair treatment but developed countries having all the power 
thwarted any attempts to alter the GATT.  This agreement laid the groundwork for developed 
countries to take advantage of developing countries and changing future trade regulations 
would prove to be a challenge. 
After the GATT came the WTO agreements, which did not do much better in 
improving trade policy for developing countries, though they did adopt a set of guidelines that 
in principle sounded good. Certainly the vast majority of the world’s nations seem to have 
believed so for they all have signed on to the WTO regime. However, in reality, power 
politics have played a central role at the WTO, and the organization has been criticized by 
various groups and third world countries for numerous things, including: being opaque and 
not allowing enough public participation, while being very welcoming to large corporations. 
While importing nations cannot distinguish how something is produced when trading, though 
it sounds good at first along the lines of equality and non-discrimination, the reality is that 
some national laws and decisions for safety and protection of people’s health, environment 
and national economies have been ruled against as barriers to free trade.  Also many 
transnational corporations (TNCs) are able to exert enormous influence in no less a powerful 
body than the WTO. These TNCs are closely linked to the WTO decision-makers themselves.  
For developing countries the WTO was another roadblock to their development. Developing 
countries expressed their disapproval of the WTO that led to the Doha Development Round 
(Gonzales 2011:769).  
The Doha Round was the response from dissatisfied countries to the WTO. Its aim 
was to achieve major reform of the international trading system through the introduction of 
lower trade barriers and revised trade rules to help alleviate some of the inequality that was 
keeping developing countries from competing fairly in trade. The Round was officially 
launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for the negotiations, including on 
agriculture, services and an intellectual property topic, which began earlier.  In Doha, 
ministers also approved a decision on how to address the problems developing countries face 
in implementing the current WTO agreements. 
Agriculture has become the most important and controversial issue at the DOHA 
round. Agriculture was particularly important for developing countries because around 75 
percent of the populations in developing countries live in rural areas, and the vast majorities 
are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods (USAID: 2010).  The first proposal in Qatar 
in 2001 called for the end agreement to commit to substantial improvements in market access 
reductions (and ultimate elimination) of all forms of export subsidies and substantial 
reductions in trade-distorting support. 
The United States is being asked by the European Union (EU) and the developing 
countries, led by Brazil and India, to make a more generous offer for reducing trade-distorting 
domestic support for agriculture. The United States is insisting that the EU and the developing 
countries agree to make more substantial reductions in tariffs and to limit the number of 
import-sensitive and special products that would be exempt from cuts. Import-sensitive 
products are of most concern to developed economies like the European Union, while 
developing countries are concerned with special products, those exempt from both tariff cuts 
and subsidy reductions because of development, food security, or livelihood considerations. 
Brazil has emphasized reductions in trade-distorting domestic subsidies, especially by the 
United States (some of which it successfully challenged in the WTO U.S.-Brazil cotton 
dispute), while India has insisted on a large number of special products that would not be 
exposed to wider market opening (USAID: 2010).   
Most countries participating in the negotiations believe that there was some economic 
benefit in adopting the agreement; however, there is considerable disagreement over how 
much benefit the agreement would actually produce. Many believed that the Doha Round was 
successful, however, in making a global concern the restructuring and adjustment of costs 
required to prevent the collapse of local industries, particularly in developing countries. 
Trade agreements must begin to allow for developing countries to have a say in policy 
issues.  In trade agreements we find that developed countries are the ones in control of 
dictating what the terms are in agreements.  There need to be protectionist policy added to 
agreement that allows for weaker countries to compete fairly in trade.   Wealthy countries 
need to afford the same benefits in trade agreements to developing countries as they take for 
themselves. If markets are to be free and open then parties in agreements cannot put 
protectionist barriers or demands on weaker countries.  Trade needs to be equal and needs to 
help the developing world compete fairly and openly with the developed world. 
 
A NEW WAY TO LOOK AT DEVELOPMENT 
Developing countries, I think most would agree, should be able to determine their own 
destinies. The developed world needs to reassess its own hegemony and try to stop getting 
countries to accept its values and instead embrace the differences and look for a way to work 
together more democratically with other countries of the developing world. 
Development has been seen as a way in which societal conditions are improved; 
however, the term improvement can mean different things to different people. A 
modernization perspective based on neo-classical theory assumes that the western model is 
the most desired.  The problem here is that a lot of developing countries do not think the 
western model is the best and look at it more as imperialist imposition that forces social 
change on countries to get them to act in a way the west deems acceptable.  Many countries 
are based more in a liberal model that lends itself to a more communal society, one in which 
wealth is shared evenly.   In developing countries the liberal theory is accepted and thought of 
as the way to empowerment while serving the community as a whole.  The new globalization 
can look to many poorer countries like another move by imperialist powers to dominate the 
poorer and formerly colonized countries. 
Indigenous peoples have always fought against development initiatives that threaten 
their communities and way of life.   Many organizations including the Zapatistas have 
denounced globalization as the West’s way of taking over and subjugating poorer countries 
into servitude for their economic gain.  For these poorer countries and with treaties such as 
NAFTA it seems the worst fears are being realized as indigenous groups watch their land and 
resources being taken away as big business drives them out of economic viability.  
Looking at this issue from an environmental justice approach we must then begin to 
respect the differences of countries and fight to protect their right to self-determination.  In 
regards to NAFTA and the displaced corn farmer, it is not right to ask them to leave their land 
and relocate to urban centers to find work.   One of NAFTA’s missions was to take displaced 
workers and train them in other fields and help them readjust into new communities.  This has 
proven not to work and has left many communities broken, with families displaced and 
separated as many look north to make a living.  The U.S. and Mexico have benefited from the 
agreement, but only a small sector of upper class elites have prospered in Mexico leaving the 
poor even poorer.  There is also a trickledown effect from the displacement because as on 
person leaves communities suffer because they are not getting the pure affordable corn that 
they were once getting from one of their community members. If we can recognize these 
problems before we implement trade agreements then we can address and find alternatives 
that would serve communities better. 
Recognizing alternative models of development is a key step to re-conceptualizing 
development.  Globalization has been sold to the world as a way for all countries to 
participate in global commerce that brings the potential for economic growth.  The truth of 
globalization is that when certain interests or approaches dominate the constructions of free 
trade policy and, as in the NAFTA case, this policy is forced upon parties, it then becomes 
something that may threaten the ecosystem and cause harm to communities. This model of 
trade and development does not promise the globalized utopia we have been promised.  In the 
future treaties need to look at different ways an agreement can be implemented.  There is 
room for experimentation to find what works and what does not, but it should not be done at 
the expense of the poor.  The current models are being fought by groups as the Zapatistas and 
leaders need to listen to them if they are to change current models for the better.  
Competition is not perfect in NAFTA, and comparative advantage does not seem to 
apply under the non-market circumstances at hand. Through unfair trade advantages from 
subsidies  one group has extracted economic rent from another and unbalanced the system 
that has lead NAFTA to cause great hardship on the small indigenous farmers who has had to 
abandon traditional ways of farming and living and suffer more displacement Big 
agribusiness has defeated small farming through lower prices and an abundance of product.  
Big business has also used its influence on political leaders, who are not accessible to the 
small farmer, in order to get policy favoritism that gives them unlimited power in the trade 
arena.  The only way to even the playing field in trade is to develop legislation that would 
keep big business from overstepping fair boundaries (Gonzales 2011:772).  
Antitrust legislation is necessary to mitigate the economic power of big agribusiness.  
The United States Department of Justice needs to participate in negotiating agreements like 
NAFTA to make sure that all parties are being treated fairly.  In NAFTA I have shown that 
big agribusiness has been favored by the agreement this has caused great stress to the poorer 
populations in Mexico.  In the future big business that operates unfairly and dominates 
various sectors that harm smaller business should be investigated to see if they are 
overstepping their boundaries, and if they are found guilty they should be excluded from 
participating in the agreement. 
The big problem is that competition usually is focused on the consumer and getting 
the best price for the consumer that will in turn generate a bigger profit for the provider of 
these goods.  Policy needs to focus as well on the small producers.  It is fine to get a product 
at a good price for the consumer, but if you are harming people in the production of the 
product then the damage outweighs the lowered consumer cost.  If markets are to be truly 
global than there should be some kind of independent legal authorities that can look at 
markets and decide if they are being run equally and fairly. 
CONCLUSION 
The NAFTA treaty is a valuable case study for future agreements where social, 
economic and ecological factors can be examined and evaluated to see if equality in trade was 
being met.  As I have shown Mexico has suffered greatly from the NAFTA agreement and 
caused a great number of migrants to leave their homes and head north to the United States 
for employment.  Mexico’s urban areas have been ill equipped to handle the first wave of 
migration from rural areas that have left the small farmers little choice but to continue to the 
border for a chance at getting to the U.S. to find work.   NAFTA has proven to be a disaster 
for the small farmer and caused a mass exodus that is pulling apart families, increasing urban 
poverty, precipitating social unrest and threatening the physical, cultural and spiritual survival 
of indigenous communities. The world will also suffer from the displacement of workers and 
they will lose the environmental friendly farming practices and genetic strains of corn that 
have been developed over centuries of cultivation in Mexico.   
Mexican migrants to the U.S. have been labeled as undesirables and criminalized for 
crossing over into the U.S.  It is time to look at our own contribution to the mass migration of 
Mexicans into the U.S. and find ways to alleviate the problem.  Building a wall and 
militarizing the border will not stop migration.  It would serve the U.S. and the world better to 
look at solutions to immigration problems instead of blaming one side for the problem.  The 
surge in immigration is one symptom of a bad economic agreement, where human needs are 
overlooked for maximized profits.  The only solution to alleviate the immigration problem is 
to provide stable employment and social services that benefit Mexican laborers.  If we invest 
and Mexico invests in its own country, than workers will have no reason to leave a land they 
love to come to the United States to work in low wage jobs to support their families back 
home.  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was to embrace 
globalization and open up markets and promote free trade, really turned out to be an 
agreement laden with protectionist initiatives that erected new barriers to equitable trade and 
development and instead brought more economic hardships to Mexico.  In the future we must 
learn from our mistakes and use our knowledge to create treaties that work to favor all. 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
1. Almekinders, C. (2001). Management of Crop Genetic Diversity at Community Level. 
Eschborn, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh. 
 
2. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. 1981. 
 
3. Babcock, Bruce (2011). The Revenue Insurance Boondoggle: A Taxpayer-Paid Windfall 
for the Industry. Environmental Working Group. 
 
4. 230 BILL VORLEY, FOOD, INC.: CORPORATE CONCENTRATION FROM FARM 
TOCONSUMER 39 (U.K. Food Grp. ed., 2003), available at http://www.ukfg.org.uk   
/docs/UKFG-Foodinc-Nov03.pdf. 
 
5. Boucher,  Stephen R., Aaron Smith, ,J. Edward Taylor, Antonio Y´unez-Naude. "Impacts 
of Policy Reforms on the Supply of Mexican Labor to U.S. Farms: New Evidence from 
Mexico." University of California, 2005. 
 
 
6. Brush, Stephen B., Bellon Corrales, Mauricio and Schmidt, Ella. “ Agricultural 
Development and Maize Diversity in Mexico” Human Ecology, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), 
pp. 307-328. 
 
7. Cavanagh, John, et al. "Debate: Happily Ever NAFTA?" Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2002. 58-65. 
 
8. Cline, Howard F. “Mexico: A Matured Latin-American Revolution, 1910-1960” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 334, Mar., 1961 
 
9. Esquivel Gerardo, and Rodríguez-López Jose Antonio. Technology, Trade, and Wage 
Inequality in Mexico before and after NAFTA. Journal of Development Economics, 72, 543-
565 December 2003. 
 
10. Fussell, Betty. The Story of Corn. University of New Mexico Press; Reprint edition 
(December 15, 2004). 
 
11. Gaspar, Fox. Indigenous Rights and Self-Determination in Mexico Cultural Survival 
(Spring 1999). 
 
12. Gonzales, Carmen G. An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative Advantage: 
Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic Reforms. Seattle 
University School of Law Legal Paper Series No. 11-07 (March 2011). 
 
13. Krooth, Richard. Mexico, Nafta, and the Hardships of Progress : Historical Patterns and 
Shifting : Methods of Oppression. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1995. 
 14. Maiki, Maecella. NAFTA, Environmental Crises, and Social Justice, Cases from the 
Agricultural Practices of Chiapanecos. Critical Theory and Social Justice Journal Volume 4 
2001 
 
15. Martin, Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip L. "The Uncertain Connection: Free Trade and 
Rural Mexican Migration to the United States " International Migration Review Vol. 27 
(1993): 484-512  
 
16. Nadal, Alejandro. The Eviornmental and Social Impacts of Economic Liberalization on 
Corn Production in Mexico. Oxfam and WWF International (September 2000). 
 
17. O'Neil, Patrick H.; Fields, Karl; Share, Don (2006). Cases in Comparative Politics (2nd 
ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
18. Orme, William A. Understanding NAFTA Mexico Free Trade and the New North 
America. First University of Texas Press, 1996 
 
19. Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Basil Blackwell, 1990 
 
20. Pital, Bimal. Multiple Roles for a Unified Continent: Negotiating NAFTA (August 1992) 
 
21. Richardson, Heather. Corn in The USA. The Journal Of The Historical Society 
(November 2010) 
 
22. 23.13. SIACON (2003). SIACON database, SAGAR. 2004 
 
23. Stephen R. Boucher, Aaron Smith, ,J. Edward Taylor, Antonio Y´unez-Naude. "Impacts 
of Policy Reforms on the Supply of Mexican Labor to U.S. Farms: New Evidence from 
Mexico." University of California, 2005. 
 
24. Surannovic, Steven, M. The Theory of Comparative Advantage. New York 2015. 
 
25. Villarreal, Angeles M. “NAFTA and the Mexican Economy” Congressional Research 
Service, June 2010. 
 
26. Walden, Howard T. Native Inheritance: The Story of Corn. Harper and Row Publishers, 
1966. 
 
27. Wasem, Ruth Ellen, Seelke, Clare Ribando, Kandel, William, Rosenblum, Marc R. 
(2012). Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends. Library of Congress. 
Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress, R42560. 
 
28. Wise, Carol. “Great Expectations: Mexico's Short-Lived Convergence under NAFTA”. 
Centre for International Governance and Innovation Working Paper No. 15, 2007. 
 
29. Wise, Timothy A. (2010). Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of 
US Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers. Washington, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars. 
 
30. Zabin, Carol, and Sallie Hughes. "Economic Integration and Labor Flows: Stage 
Migration in Farm Labor Markets in Mexico and the United States." The Center for 
Migration Studies of New York, Inc., 1995. 395-422. Vol. 29. 
 
31. Zahniser, Steven and Coyle, William. “U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade During the NAFTA era: 
New Twists to an Old Story”.  Economic Research Service/USDA, May 2004. 
 
32. Zahniser, Steven and Coyle, William. “U.S.-Mexico Agricultural trade during the 
NAFTA Era” Economic Research Service/USDA, January 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
